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Abstract
A dozen leading economists reviewed the General Theory in major
journals—none with enthusiasm. The enthusiasm came later, and younger
members of the profession provided it. For one-third of a century Key-
nes was to influence both theory and public policy more profoundly than
any economist since Smith. Already at the climax of such influence,
in 1956, Hicks expressed "the feeling that the world of the fifties
... may be Keynesian in its policies, but it is not Keynesian in its
working."
The article briefly summarizes Keynes's theoretical structure
and discusses its realism—benefiting from the hindsight of half a
century that took us from the Great Depression to the Great Inflation.

HAMS BREMS
99 Commerce West
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Champaign, IL 61820
KEYNES IN RETROSPECT
1. Say's Law
The question to which Keynes's General Theory offered an answer was
as old as economic theory itself: under flexible prices and money
wage, interest, and exchange rates will a capitalist economy left to
itself generate an aggregate demand sufficient to fully utilize avail-
able resources?
Say's [1803 (1830)] affirmative answer offers a convenient point of
departure for Keynes's negative answer. Say's Law came in two parts.
The first part is noncontroversial and consists of the national
product-national income identity: generation of product is generation
of value added, and value added is somebody's earnings. Consequently
money national income defined as aggregate earnings arising from
current production is identically equal to national product defined as
the market value of physical output. Thus generated, does income
become demand? The second part of Say's Law is controversial and con-
sists of the statement that the savings, import, and tax leakages will
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always be stopped by investment, export, and government expenditure,
respectively, so income does become demand.
General Theory concentrated on the savings leakage, assumed a
closed economy, and said nothing about fiscal policy—a subject taken
up five years later by Hansen (1941).
2. The Savings Leakage
Income saved does not directly demand domestic output. Will the
leakage be stopped by a price mechanism? Specifically will a well-
functioning capital market exist in which a flexible rate of interest
serves as an equilibrating variable between saving and investment—as
Turgot [1769-1770 (1922: 74)] had suggested and Smith [1776 (1805:
78-79)] repeated?
Keynes (1936) did not think so. The savings leakage would be
stopped alright, but income rather than interest would be the equili-
brating variable. Income would always adjust until the amount of it
saved was no more and no less than what could be invested. How did
Keynes eliminate the rate of interest as an equilibrating variable?
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Figure V-l. A Keynesian Interest-Output Equilibrium
Found by Intersecting IS and LM Curves
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3. The Rate of Interest Not Equilibrating Savings and Investment
As Patinkin (1976: 99) observed, Keynes always believed that his
rate of interest equilibrated the supply of and the demand for money
but never savings and investment. Income took care of savings and
investment
!
Such tidy compartraentalization misunderstands the nature of general
equilibrium—but Keynes's tradition was Marshallian partial equilibrium
rather than Walrasian general equilibrium. Normally all equilibrating
variables must help satisfy all equilibrium conditions. That the
Keynesian system is no exception is most easily seen from the celebrated
IS-LM diagram.
Such a diagram, shown in figure V-l , has two equilibrating vari-
ables: the rate of interest r plotted on the vertical axis and physical
output X plotted on the horizontal one. The diagram also has two
equilibrium conditions.
The first equilibrium condition is that supply of and demand for
goods are equal, and the IS curve is the locus of all interest-output
combinations satisfying that condition. Physical investment is sen-
sitive to the rate of interest and is the higher the lower the rate of
interest. Physical consumption is sensitive to output and is the
higher the higher the physical output and with it real income. As a
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result, aggregate demand for goods will be high at a low rate of
interest and a high output. In other words the IS curve is a
negatively sloped one.
The second equilibrium condition is that supply of and demand for
money are equal, and the LM curve is the locus of all interest-output
combinations satisfying that condition. Demand for money is sensitive
to the rate of interest and is the higher the lower the rate of interest,
Demand for money is also sensitive to output and is the higher the
higher the output to be transacted. The LM curve is drawn for a given
money supply. As a result, at a high rate of interest—forcing people
to economize with their money holdings—such a given money supply will
go farther and transact a higher output than it could have done at a
low rate of interest. In other words the LM curve is a positively
sloped one.
Complete equilibrium must satisfy both equilibrium conditions,
and only the intersection point between the IS and LM curves will do
that. In other words, both equilibrating variables help satisfy both
equilibrium conditions, and Keynes's neat compartmentalization of his
own system was a misunderstanding.
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4. The Rate of Interest Weak As an Equilibrating Variable: The Short Run
There was, however, more to Keynes than his misunderstanding the
nature of his own general equilibrium. His IS and LM curves could have
such special forms that the rate of interest would not be of much help
in stopping the savings leakage.
First, due to a low interest elasticity of investment at low
interest rates it would become increasingly difficult to encourage
additional investment by depressing the interest rate. The lower end
of our IS curve would become nearly vertical! And, second, due to a
high interest elasticity of the demand for money at low interest rates
it would also become increasingly difficult to depress the interest
rate by expanding the money supply. The lower end of our LM curve
would become nearly horizontal! All in all, investment would have
little give in it, and saving would have to adjust to it via Keynes's
income mechanism. Indeed, as Kaldor (1966) put it: "The whole dispute
between Keynesian and non-Keynesian theories is whether investment
determines savings, or vice versa."
How realistic are such special forms of the IS and LM curves? Of
the low interest elasticity of investment Keynes himself may have been
less convinced than were some of his followers. To the high interest
elasticity of his demand for money he (1936: 207) referred as a
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"possibility". However that may be, later empirical work from
Bronfenbrenner and Mayer (1960) to Barth, Kraft, and Kraft (1976) has
not confirmed it.
5. Post-Keynesians : The Profits Share As a Long-Run Equilibrating
Variable
Keynes himself was preoccupied with the short run and attempted
neither to trace the effect of investment upon physical capital stock,
to use a production function relating the flow of physical output to
physical capital stock, nor to optimize the latter. Indeed his model
never mentioned physical capital stock.
Could his short-run model be extended to the long run and still
consider investment as determining savings rather than the other way
around? Post-Keynesians like Robinson (1956) and Kaldor (1957) made
the attempt. By making the capital coefficient a technological
constant and assuming steady-state growth they could treat the invest-
ment fraction of output as autonomous and let the savings fraction of
output adjust to it. Now according to the post-Keynesians savings came
solely out of profits. The only way left for the savings fraction to
adjust, then, would be for the profits share of income to adjust.
Thus, by extending a Keynesian adjustment of saving to an autono-
mous investment from the short to the long run, Robinson-Kaldor had
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salvaged a Keynesian tradition. But had they also simulated the real
world? In the real world will distributive shares adjust as Robinson-
Kaldor say they should? Or will the capital coefficient adjust as neo-
classicists say it should? The distributive shares are practically the
same in all industrial economies. By contrast, capital coefficients
and savings fractions differ strikingly among them. The United States
has both the lowest capital coefficient and the lowest savings
fraction—as neoclassical theory would suggest.
So far we have mentioned neither prices nor money wage rates.
Could they conceivably be equilibrating variables stopping a savings
leakage?
6. Price and Wage Flexibility Equilibrating Savings and Investment Via
a Real-Balance Effect upon Consumption
Let there be excess supply in the labor market in the form of
unemployment. Let price and money wage rates be flexible and
responding to such excess supply, then price and the money wage rate
fall in the same proportion, so the real wage rate and with it the
supply of labor is unaffected. But the demand for labor is affected.
The declining price will be raising the real value of money balances
—
the more so the farther price declines. Modify the Keynesian consumption
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function by adding such real balances to it and give them a chance to
stimulate consumption. Then price will keep declining until the real-
balance effect has stimulated demand enough to restore full employment.
The stimulus is the result of adding real wealth to the consumption
function and will play its role even when the rate of interest can play
no role.
The real-balance effect was introduced by Pigou (1943, 1945) and
Patinkin (1956). In Haberler's (1952: 241) judgment, such a real-
balance effect "removes the narrow remaining base of... static com-
petitive underemployment equilibrium"—and may in that sense be seen as
a modern rehabilitation of Say's Law. But the real-balance effect was
no part of Keynes's own system.
7. Price and Wage Flexibility Equilibrating Savings and Investment Via
an Interest Effect upon Investment
By contrast, Keynes's own price and wage flexibility worked via the
rate of interest rather than via consumption. Prices and money wage
rates falling in the same proportion would leave wage earners no worse
off and entrepreneurs no better off in real terms. Keynes's goods-
market equilibrium was a flow equilibrium ignoring all stocks such as
real balances. To him, then, everything in the goods market would
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remain unaffected. But falling prices and money wage rates at unaf-
fected physical output would reduce the transaction demand for money,
hence release money for asset holding, and asset holders would hold it
only at a reduced rate of interest. The reduced rate of interest would
stimulate investment: by the detour of price and wage flexibility we
are back at the rate of interest equilibrating saving and investment.
But, then, Keynes argued, how much simpler wouldn't it be to accom-
plish the same thing by an expansionary monetary policy at frozen prices
and money wage rates? That brings us to Keynes's labor standard of
money.
8. Keynes's Labor Standard of Money
Keynes froze his money wage rate and was fond of measuring his
variables in "wage units." Walras would have called his choice a
choice of labor as a numeraire . Hicks (1983: 18) called it a choice
of a labor standard of money.
Under such a labor standard let the monetary authorities follow
Keynes and try to reduce the rate of unemployment by expanding the
money supply and buying bonds in the open market. At first demand, and
with it economic activity, will be stimulated. To an unforeseen stimu-
lation of demand, goods prices may respond more readily than will the
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money wage rate. Consequently at first there may be a decline of the
real wage rate experienced by entrepreneurs but not yet expected by
labor. That discrepancy may at first reduce the rate of unemployment.
But will the labor standard hold up? Keynes assumed it to, but as
Hicks (1983: 18) observed there is a crucial difference between a gold
standard and a labor standard.
A gold standard not only announces the price of gold but also makes
it prevail. What makes it prevail is that central banks can and will
buy and sell gold in unlimited quantities at the announced price—and
when they cannot do that the gold standard will break down. Central
banks cannot, and labor unions will not, buy and sell labor in unlimited
quantities at an announced money wage rate. A reduced rate of unemploy-
ment will put upward pressure on the money wage rate: the nonaugmented
Phillips (1958) curve was born.
Strangely, Keynes had assumed labor to harbor money illusions in
the sense that labor would bargain for a money, not a real, wage rate.
Experience did not bear him out. Labor, too, has inflationary expec-
tations manifesting themselves in the escalator clauses of collective
agreements: the expectations-augmented Phelps (1967) version of the
Phillips curve was born. As it turns out, the more completely such a
curve allows for labor's inflationary expectations the more explosive
the price-wage spiral will be. Keynes's labor standard had broken down.
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9. A "Natural" Rate of Unemployment
Is there such a thing as a "natural" rate of unemployment below
which the rate of unemployment may stay for only as long as the money
supply and inflation keep accelerating, and to which the rate of unem-
ployment would return once the monetary authorities would give up their
policy of accelerating the money supply? Pre-Keynesian British econo-
mists like Cannan, Clay, and Pigou had anticipated such a concept, as
Casson (1984) reports. Friedman (1968: 8) coined the term and defined
it as a rate of unemployment below which excess demand for labor would
push the real wage rate up, and above which excess supply would push it
down. Friedman (1968: 9) emphasized that some of the forces deter-
mining the natural rate of unemployment were man-made and policy-made
such as minimum-wage statutes and unemployment-compensation statutes.
Is "natural" unemployment involuntary? It may be to union members
but not to union leadership. Is "natural" unemployment curable? Hicks
(1983: 17) decided simply to call unemployment curable by Keynesian
policies "Keynesian unemployment" and judged that since 1970 we may,
for the most time, have been in a state of Keynesian "full" employment!
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10. The Import Leakage
In General Theory Keynes did not discuss the import leakage but did
so in other writings. The import leakage is relevant to the failure of
his labor standard, and we must see how.
Income spent on import does not directly demand domestic output.
Will the leakage be stopped by a price mechanism? Specifically will a
well-functioning foreign-exchange market exist in which a flexible rate
of exchange serves as an equilibrating variable between import and
export?
Keynes's assumption of a frozen money wage rate—his labor
standard—was much older than General Theory and explained his attack
on Britain's 1925 return to a gold standard— "a barbarous relic"—based
on pre-1914 parity. At 1925 money wage rates such a parity overvalued
the pound, encouraged import, discouraged export, and made it impossible
to stop the import leakage.
Keynes welcomed the devaluation of the pound in 1931 and of the
dollar in 1933: they made it possible to stop the import leakage. No
longer worrying about it and trusting his labor standard, Keynes could
now go to work on his General Theory and write it as if his economy
were a closed one.
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The United States economy very nearly was one, both because of its
sheer size and because the dollar became the world's reserve currency.
For almost four decades to come, Americans could view their balance of
payments with what became known as "benign neglect". Even the United
States labor market was different: less than one-fifth of it was
unionized, and Keynes's labor standard might stand a better chance here
than in highly-unionized Britain. Perhaps for such reasons it was on
the North American continent that advances in the Keynesian art largely
took place just as it was on the European continent that advances in
mathematics largely took place after Newton, as Samuelson (1983: 20-21)
has suggested.
But even in the United States all good things come to an end. The
1971 floating of the dollar and the 1974 oil and food shocks were a
rude awakening. For domestic and international reasons alike Keynes's
labor standard had failed and could be salvaged by neither price and
wage controls, "incomes policies," nor "social compacts." Half a cen-
tury had taken us from the Great Depression to the Great Inflation.
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FOOTNOTE
An empirical comparison between post-Keynesians and neoclassicists
was offered by Brems (1977) with reply by A. S. Eichner and J. A. Kregel
and rejoinder by Brems in the same issue. A theoretical comparison was
offered by Brems (1979).
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